INTRODUCTION
In 2012, one-year-old Carlos Cardenas wandered away from his caregivers at Praise Fellowship Assembly of God in Indianapolis, Indiana, where four staff members supervised over fifty children, and drowned in the church's baptismal font. 1 In 2010, seven-week-old Dylan Cummings was placed
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[ Vol. 86 Part I describes the development of judicial exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause and of statutory accommodations under the Establishment Clause. Though these two regimes were developed in response to different clauses, they are deeply imbricated such that an understanding of one is impossible without an understanding of the other. Part I.A examines the rise and fall of judicial exemptions developed under the Free Exercise Clause in a line of cases starting with Reynolds v. United States, 9 through Employment Division v. Smith, 10 and culminating in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 11 (RFRA) and its state cousins. Part I.B turns to the statutory accommodation regime developed under the Establishment Clause and examines two principal tests for evaluating claims under the Establishment Clause: the Lemon 12 test and the Texas Monthly 13 test.
Part II takes up the doctrine of harm to third parties as a tool for challenging the statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares. Part II.A considers the development of the doctrine of third-party harm in the context of religious freedom, and Part II.B considers the invocation of the third-party-harm doctrine in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 14 Part III examines the statutes freeing religiously affiliated daycares from state regulations in the framework of statutory accommodations and judicial exemptions developed in Part I and explores how these accommodations have fared in the courts when they have been challenged by secular daycares.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the opportunities and challenges the doctrine of third-party harm poses for advocates seeking to limit statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares.
I. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVERSATION: JUDICIAL EXEMPTIONS AND STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS
While the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause protect different rights, these rights are closely connected, leading to significant overlap in their interpretation and application. Broadly speaking, the organizing principle of free exercise jurisprudence is that of 9 . 98 U. S. 145 (1878) . The Court denied a Mormon man engaged in plural marriage an exemption from the law against bigamy. Id. at 167. 10. 494 U. S. 872 (1990) . The Court denied adherents of the Native American Church who used peyote as part of a religious ritual an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 890.
11. 42 U.S. C. § 2000bb (2012) , invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997) . 12 . Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. The three-pronged test asks (1) whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose, (2) whether the statute's primary effect is to inhibit or advance religion, and (3) whether the statute results in excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. 13. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1989) . This two-step test builds on Lemon, asking first whether the law in question confers a benefit only on religious organizations and, if so, proceeding to two questions: (1) whether the benefit can be justified as lifting a preexisting government-imposed burden on free exercise and (2) whether the benefit imposes significant burdens on third parties. Id. 14. 134 S. Ct. 2751 Ct. (2014 .
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antidiscrimination, 15 with the question of judicial exemptions dominating the case law. Under a judicial-exemptions regime, religious individuals or organizations bring suit alleging that a neutral law of general applicability disproportionately affects religious persons. 16 The organizing principle of a significant portion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, by contrast, is that of statutory accommodation. 17 Under a statutory-accommodation regime, the legislature enacts a law that confers some benefit on religious persons or organizations, often by freeing them from some regulation or tax. 18 Distinguishing judicial exemptions from statutory accommodations-and thus Free Exercise Clause claims from Establishment Clause claims-is more difficult in practice than this schema might lead one to believe. This is particularly evident in the imprecision of the language used to discuss the two Clauses: statutory accommodations, for instance, are often referred to as exemptions, which leads to analytical confusion. Thus, while this Note focuses on statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares, it is necessary to consider the history and development of both judicial exemptions and statutory accommodations.
A. The Rise and Fall of Judicial Exemptions: From Reynolds to Smith
Exemptions for religious persons and institutions from generally applicable laws under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause emerged only in the 1960s, and its brief history has been a tumultuous one. Prior to the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court forcefully rejected the concept of exemptions on free exercise grounds. Indeed, in Reynolds, the Court's first engagement with the Free Exercise Clause, the Court famously found that to permit exemptions from generally applicable laws on the grounds of religious belief "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances." 19 From 1878 until the 1960s, the rejection of exemptions purely on free exercise grounds remained firmly in place. On those rare occasions that religious claimants prevailed at the Court, they did so by 15 . Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious belief or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."). 16 . See generally Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994) . 17 . A separate element of Establishment Clause jurisprudence pushes back against the dominant religion's use of power by limiting prayer in schools, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 424-25 (1962) , financial assistance to religious bodies, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, and the display of religious symbols, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 704-05 (1984 
The Inauguration of Exemptions:
Sherbert and Yoder
Starting in the 1960s, the Warren Court's liberal majority inaugurated a new era in free exercise jurisprudence, rejecting the Court's reasoning in Reynolds and embracing exemptions as a way to preserve religious liberty in an increasingly pluralistic society. The Court announced exemptions on free exercise grounds in its 1963 decision in Sherbert, in which the Court held that denying a woman unemployment benefits because her religious beliefs prevented her from working on Saturday violated her constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. 24 Scholars have since argued that Sherbert and two related cases 25 constitute a special and discrete set of cases limited to unemployment benefits. 26 Even if one accepts that Sherbert is so limited, the three-prong test for evaluating free exercise claims introduced in Sherbert nevertheless laid the groundwork for the seminal judicial exemptions case, Wisconsin v. Yoder . 27 Briefly, the three-prong test runs as follows: First, the court asks whether the government's actions burden a person's free exercise of religion. 28 
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burden must be substantial: a trivial burden would not survive this prong. 29 If the first prong is met, the state must then meet the second and third prongs. The second prong asks whether the state has a compelling interest generally in the law at issue. 30 Finally, under the third prong, the burden must be narrowly tailored; that is, there must be no alternative regulation that would both achieve the state's interest and avoid infringing on free exercise. 31 Thus, under the third prong, the state must demonstrate that it truly requires uniform adherence to the law in question. If the claimant satisfies the first prong, and the state fails to satisfy the second and third prongs, then the individual is entitled to an exemption from the otherwise generally applicable law at issue. 32 Thus, though the Sherbert test arguably would come to be confined to unemployment cases, at the time it was decided, it signaled a radical new openness to exemptions on free exercise grounds. The Court's new approach to exemptions on free exercise grounds is exemplified in Yoder, in what some have characterized as the first-and perhaps only-true exemption case in which the claimant prevailed. 33 In Yoder, Amish parents sought to withdraw their children from school after eighth grade though state law required attendance in public or private school until age sixteen. 34 Applying the three-prong Sherbert test, the Court held that the Amish were entitled to an exemption from the generally applicable law on free exercise grounds. First, the Court found that compelling Amish children to remain in school past eighth grade constituted a burden on the respondents' religious practices that was "not only severe, but inescapable." 35 Second, the Court determined that the state lacked a compelling interest for imposing said burden. 36 With the state having failed the second prong, the Court did not discuss the third prong-whether the law in question was narrowly tailored. Framed in the terminology of the Sherbert test, the Yoder decision resembled a simple balancing test, with the interests of the Amish parents in perpetuating the community weighed against the state's dual interests in ensuring uniform adherence to the law and in producing an educated citizenry. 37 Curiously, the question of exactly whose interests-the parents' or the children's-were properly considered in the balancing test was addressed only cursorily. Douglas argued powerfully that the interests of the children ought also to be considered. 38 Though it is the parents who suffer the legal consequences of keeping their children out of school, it is the children who suffer the social and academic consequences of leaving school before the age of sixteen. Douglas thus argued that the case should be remanded and that each of the affected students be canvassed. 39 Douglas's dissent illustrates that the impulse to weigh third-party harms in the balance when evaluating judicial exemption cases arose quite early in the life of the exemption regime. After a strong initial showing in the 1960s through the 1970s, the exemptions regime suffered setbacks in a trio of cases in the 1980s. 40 The balancing language of Yoder was invoked in United States v. Lee, 41 in which the Court held that the interest of the state in maintaining a uniform social security system outweighed the harms the social security program, anathema to Amish religion, imposed on the Amish plaintiffs. 42 Though it was "sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise Clause," the Court held that "every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs." 43 Further challenges followed, but the judicial exemptions regime hobbled along until, in 1990, it was dealt a mortal blow in Employment Division v. Smith. 44 
The Narrowing of Judicial Exemptions:
Smith and Its Progeny
In a deeply controversial decision, the Court rejected the exemption regime in language lifted straight from Reynolds. 45 In Smith, two individuals were denied unemployment benefits after they were dismissed from their jobs because they had ingested peyote. 46 The claimants, who were active members of the Native American Church, ingested the peyote as part of a religious ritual and asserted that the general prohibition on peyote under Oregon's controlled substance law violated the Free Exercise Clause when 38 
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applied to the sacramental use of peyote. 47 The Court roundly rejected this claim and observed that the balancing test developed in Sherbert had never been used to grant an exemption from a generally applicable criminal law. 48 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that "[t]o make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,'-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." 49 Indeed, the majority observed that anarchy could result from applying a compelling government interest standard in free exercise cases. 50
a. Congress Responds to Smith: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
This full-throated evisceration of judicial exemptions on free exercise grounds was met with sustained public outcry, and Congress's response to the public uproar over Smith was swift and decisive. 51 In 1993, a unanimous House of Representatives and a nearly unanimous Senate passed RFRA. 52 In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Ted Kennedy, who introduced the bill along with twenty-three other Senators, characterized RFRA as simply restoring the "compelling government interest" requirement for evaluating free exercise claims using pre-Smith standards. 53 Indeed, the purposes of RFRA are enumerated as follows:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) 
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[ Vol. 86 (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government. 54 RFRA thus straddles the divide between judicial exemptions and legislative accommodations; operating as a legislative accommodation intended to restore the jurisprudence of judicial exemption. In practice, RFRA authorizes judges to apply strict scrutiny and to determine whether a neutral law of general applicability has imposed a substantial burden. In other words, RFRA instructs courts to continue their pre-Smith practices but to do so as a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation. 55 Though the likely impact of RFRA in its 1993 form on free exercise jurisprudence is debatable, 56 its decisive passage and overwhelming public support signaled a popular openness to judicial exemptions. The Court's schizophrenic response to RFRA, however, underscored a profound uncertainty on the Supreme Court regarding judicial exemptions.
b. The Court Responds to RFRA:
Boerne and O Centro
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio sought an exemption under RFRA from city zoning laws. 57 The Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and so was unconstitutional. 58 61 Nearly ten years after the Court had severely hobbled RFRA as it applied to the states, it affirmed RFRA as it applied to the federal government. 62 In O Centro, the Court upheld a preliminary injunction granting a religious group an exemption from the Controlled Substances Act in order to import hoasca, a hallucinogenic drug used in the group's religious rituals. 63 Applying the compelling-interest test detailed in the statute, the Court found that the government failed to show that hoasca was dangerous to human health and that importation by the group posed a risk of drug trafficking. 64 Although the Court maintained that RFRA could not require the Court to adopt the Sherbert test, it supported RFRA's commitment to a balancing approach. 65 The heavy burden of persuasion that the Court identified points to a reinvigoration of strict scrutiny as applied to the actions of the federal government. That the decision was unanimous is a strong signal that, by 2006, the Court was once again open to statutory accommodations on free exercise grounds.
c. RFRA at the State Level
With RFRA gutted at the federal level, a number of states responded by passing their own versions of RFRA ("state RFRAs"). 66 All states protect religious freedom in some way, and the vast majority of state constitutions contain both free exercise and establishment provisions. 67 The language of these provisions, though, differs across states and differs from the language of the First Amendment. Many state constitutions, for instance, contain superstrong establishment clauses that go beyond the federal Establishment Clause and are primarily directed at limiting financial aid to sectarian 60 . Id 69 On the heels of the public outcry over Smith and Boerne, however, many state legislatures followed Congress's lead and passed state RFRAs, often as constitutional amendments. In an additional ten states, RFRA-like provisions have become law through state court decisions. 70 Where state RFRAs have been enacted through legislation, the language often draws verbatim from RFRA. Consider, for instance, Virginia's legislation:
No government entity shall substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is (i) essential to further a compelling governmental interest and (ii) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 71 Despite the rush to pass state RFRAs, many have languished largely unused and unchallenged for twenty years. 72 As the free exercise landscape 68 . See, e.g., MO. CONST. art 1, § 7 ("[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and . . . no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship."). Nothing in this section shall be construed to (i) authorize any government entity to burden any religious belief or (ii) affect, interpret or in any way address those portions of Article 1, Section 16 of the Constitution of Virginia, the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom ( § 57-1 et seq.), and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution that prohibit laws respecting the establishment of religion. Granting government funds, benefits or exemptions, to the extent permissible under clause (ii) of this subsection, shall not constitute a violation of this section. As used in this subsection, "granting" used with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions shall not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.
Id.
72 
B. Statutory Accommodations and the Establishment Clause
While Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence involves judicial exemptions, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is centered on legislative accommodations. Though both create carve-outs from neutral laws of general applicability, exemptions are ordered by the judiciary by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause, while accommodations are written into the law by legislative discretion.
Whether and how accommodation can be distinguished from establishment is hotly contested. Advocates for statutory accommodation argue that the distinction is straightforward and turns on whether the statute in question promotes a favored form of religion or allows religious individuals the free exercise of religion. 74 Opponents of statutory accommodation, by contrast, argue that any accommodation of religion is tantamount to the establishment of religion. Indeed, as a reflection of Enlightenment values, the Establishment Clause is suspicious-and not protective-of religion. 75 The 
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The Lemon Test and the Entanglement Prong
As we have seen, the development of judicial exemptions has been marked by false starts and doctrinal shifts. The development of statutory accommodations under the Establishment Clause has been no different. Though the Lemon test has been challenged repeatedly, it remains the touchstone for assessing the constitutionality of statutory accommodations under the Establishment Clause. In Lemon, state monies were paid to religiously affiliated schools to supplement the salaries of teachers of secular subjects. 78 The Court held that the state aid violated the Establishment Clause, concluding that "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter . . . and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn." 79 The Court set out a three-pronged test for determining where these lines should be drawn. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, the statute's primary effect must not advance or inhibit the practice of religion; 80 and third, the statute must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion. 81 Of these three, the entanglement prong raises particularly difficult interpretive questions, especially with regard to statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares.
The Court opened its analysis of the entanglement prong by acknowledging that total separation of church and state is neither practical nor desirable. 82 Nor is it possible to construct a precise set of rules for determining whether a statute creates excessive entanglement. 83 Rather, a more nuanced approach is required, one that examines the "character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and 76. 483 U. S. 327 (1987 the religious authority." 84 In Lemon, the Court found that the schools in question were of a substantial religious character. 85 Indeed, recognition of this led the state to implement careful government controls and oversight of the aid to ensure that the funds were used only to support secular purposes. 86 The monitoring needed to guard against the use of funds to support the religious mission of the schools, however, resulted in the unacceptable entanglement of church and state. 87 In addition to requiring the direct intervention of the state into the affairs of a religious institution, the Court worried that state aid to religious schools would be dangerously divisive. 88 While the application of the Lemon test has shifted since it was established in 1971, the contours of the entanglement prong have remained largely intact. Concerns about administrative entanglement, the type of entanglement at issue in Lemon, remain particularly prominent. In Lemon, the test was used to invalidate state aid to religion, yet religious groups seeking statutory accommodations have also invoked excessive entanglement to argue for the right to be free of state oversight. 89 Statutory accommodations that restrict state inspection of the religious content of a religious organization do not extend, however, to all secular government activity. 90 For example, courts have held that religious organizations must comply with fire inspections and building and zoning regulations, 91 as well as record-keeping requirements. 92 The excessiveentanglement test, developed to address the issue of when, if ever, state funds may be used to support the secular activities of a religious group, raises as many questions as it answers. As such, while the excessive-entanglement test stands as one of the chief interpretive approaches to the Establishment Clause, the Court has developed other approaches, principally the three-step framework in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock. 93 
The Texas Monthly Test: Free Exercise Burdens and Harm to Third Parties
In Texas Monthly, the Court considered whether a statutory accommodation granted to religious groups violated the Establishment Clause. 94 The Court struck down a Texas law that exempted religious 84 . Id 95 In its analysis, the Brennan plurality developed a three-step framework for determining whether a legislative accommodation is appropriate under the Establishment Clause. 96 The threshold question is whether the benefits are available to a broad array of recipients, secular and religious alike. 97 If the benefits flow exclusively to religious recipients, the threshold is met, and the Court moves to the second step, which consists of two prongs. 98 In the first prong of the second step, the Court asks whether the benefits lift an obstacle imposed by the government on the free exercise of religion, while in the second prong, the Court asks whether the accommodation imposes harm on third parties. 99 As to the threshold question, while not every nonreligious group need benefit, enough nonreligious groups must benefit to demonstrate that the benefit is not targeted to religious groups. Thus, a government program that is neutral in its offerings such that benefits do not flow exclusively, or nearly so, to religious institutions or persons may "withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny without further analysis." 100 As to the first prong, if a benefit flows only to religious groups or persons, this benefit can be justified if it lifts a preexisting government-imposed free exercise burden. The deep entanglement of free exercise jurisprudence and establishment jurisprudence is evident. Indeed, it has been observed that the Court has not yet "flesh[ed] out the operational meaning of this principle," 101 thereby sidestepping the interpretive difficulties that arise when the two Clauses appear to be at odds. In these so-called mixed-effect cases, granting a legislative accommodation would alleviate a free exercise burden, but such an accommodation may also create establishment problems where it imposed significant harm on third parties. 102 As to the second prong, the Court asks after harms to third parties. Religion-only benefits granted through statutory accommodations may be appropriate only if they do not impose "substantial" burdens on third parties. The Court offers little guidance, however, for determining when a burden on 95 . Id a third party is so substantial that it would militate against an accommodation. 103 Thus, while harm to third parties as a limiting factor on establishment claims is within the Texas Monthly framework, the contours of what constitutes a harm to third parties sufficient to defeat statutory accommodation remains largely unexplored. It is not clear in the Brennan plurality whether the two prongs in step two are properly read as disjunctive (i.e., a religion-only benefit is appropriate if it lifts a free exercise burden or imposes significant harm on a third party) or as conjunctive (i.e., a religiononly benefit is appropriate if it lifts a free exercise burden and also does not impose a significant harm on a third party).
Harm to Third Parties: The Ministerial Exception in Hosanna-Tabor and Amos
Under the ministerial exception, some of the internal affairs of religious organizations may be exempt from generally applicable laws. 104 Within Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the ministerial exception line of cases occupies the muddy middle ground between judicial exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause and legislative accommodations under the Establishment Clause. Religious organizations arguing for a ministerial exception, then, do so from both Clauses: to be free to practice their religion, there must be limits on state oversight of religious matters.
Two justifications for the ministerial exemption are relevant to the question of statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares: (1) to protect religious rules of ministry that would otherwise be prohibited in a secular context and (2) to protect the right of religious organizations to evaluate its employees according to religious standards. 105 As such, the ministerial exception is an explicit grant intended to benefit only religious organizations. The complexity of the ministerial exception in action as a legislative accommodation is illustrated in a pair of cases: and received the designation of "called" teacher, meaning she understood herself as being called to her vocation by God, could be fired for violating the religious teachings of the Church. 108 Upholding the Church's right to fire the teacher, the Court held that the ministerial exception shielded the churchoperated school from liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 109 which would otherwise have protected the interests of a school employee. 110 Indeed, failing to grant the ministerial exception would violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 111 The Court's holding in Hosanna-Tabor was narrow, finding only that the ministerial exception precluded an employment discrimination suit brought by a minister. 112 Evaluating the claim under the Texas Monthly test, however, would likely result in a similar outcome. First, the benefitexemption from certain ADA provisions-would flow only to religious institutions. Having met the threshold requirement of the first step, the analysis would then consider the two prongs of the second step. First, does this religion-only benefit lift a preexisting government-imposed free exercise burden? The ministerial exception underscores the great deference shown to religious groups in the appointment of religious personnel. As such, the church would likely prevail on this first prong of the second step.
Considering how the accommodation might fare under the second prong of the Texas Monthly test is instructive. The Court acknowledged that its ruling imposed harms on a third party-namely, the teacher who lost her job. 113 Having done so, the Court laid out a three-part test for evaluating third-party harm: (1) the magnitude of the harm imposed on the third party, (2) the likelihood of the harm occurring, and (3) the magnitude of the belief impacted. In Hosanna-Tabor, the magnitude of the harm imposed on the third party was significant: the teacher lost her job. The likelihood of the harm occurring, or that other teachers would be fired for violating a religious stricture, was also high. Further, it is unlikely that threatening to sue to enforce one's civil rights constitutes legitimate grounds for dismissal. Finally, the magnitude of the impacted belief was also high, as it cut to the quick of the Church's expectations of its ministers. With all three elements of the Texas Monthly framework raising strong concerns, and two of the three elements militating against a statutory accommodation, the Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor thus underscores the arguably outsized weight given to 108 If Hosanna-Tabor represents a relatively straightforward application of the ministerial exception, Amos underscores the Court's capacious understanding of the exception's scope. In Amos, a building engineer at a gymnasium owned and operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS) was fired when he failed to secure a certificate from the LDS authorities that he was a member in good standing. 114 The employee sued, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 115 The Court rejected the employee's argument, finding that § 702, which permits religious organizations to discriminate on religious grounds, applied to the secular nonprofit activities of said organizations. 116 Thus, though Amos ostensibly addresses whether a statutory accommodation violates the Establishment Clause, judicial exemptions and the free exercise concerns they address also played an important role in the Court's reasoning.
Acknowledging the deep connection between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Court concluded that properly curtailing government interference in religious life disfavors not only positive statutory mandates to which a religious group must conform its practices but also statutes that would force a religious organization to defend its beliefs and practices before a judge who "would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission," as so doing places a "significant burden on a religious organization." 117 The wall of separation between church and state thus appears particularly impregnable, with religious organizations effectively shielded from having to defend practices forbidden to secular organizations.
As an extension of the ministerial exception to employees whose ministerial function was tenuous at best, Amos underscores the complexity of the exception. 118 For some, the ministerial exception is fundamental to protecting religious institutions from state dominance. 119 Others endorse ministerial exceptions less because they fear state overreach in religious affairs and more because they are skeptical of the courts' ability to properly distinguish religious from non-religious job functions. 120 Still others argue 114 . Corp 
II. THE THIRD-PARTY-HARM DOCTRINE AS A TOOL TO CHALLENGE EXEMPTIONS FROM STATE REGULATIONS
The third-party-harm doctrine is both implicit in the strict scrutiny analysis developed with regard to judicial exemptions 122 and is, or should be, used by legislators in the creation of statutory accommodations. 123 While the institutional question of who is best positioned to evaluate third-party harm claims is complex, abandoning the responsibility entirely to the legislators is not advisable. 124 Rather, there is an important role for courts to intervene when statutory accommodations impose significant harms on third parties. 125 As a balancing test, the third-party-harm doctrine counsels that "[r]ather than subordinating all religious conduct to laws of general application (or vice versa), . . . enforcement of, or exemption from, a law should be determined by reference to the effect such decisions have on third parties." 126 Not all statutory accommodations of religious practices impose burdens on third parties, and some burdens are insignificant because they are widely distributed. 127 The notion of harm to third parties as a limiting factor on . The authors note that in O Centro, the Court observed that the sect's drug use did not impose a burden on third parties outside the sect, and that in Walz, tax exemptions for churches do not impose a significant burden on third parties because the burden is distributed across a large and indeterminate class. Id. religious freedom is entrenched in both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Comporting with the intuitions of both religion clauses, then, the doctrine of harm to third parties is uniquely positioned to ease the tensions that arise when free exercise and establishment concerns abut one another. Statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares raise both free exercise and establishment concerns, and as such the third-party-harm doctrine illuminates a new-and potentially more successful-strategy for challenging these accommodations. The following Part sketches the core concerns of the doctrine of third-party harms and key moments in the emergence of the third-party-harm test.
A. The Doctrine of Third-Party Harm: Definitions and Developments
The idea that harm to third parties might function as a limiting factor on judicial exemptions and statutory accommodations in the name of religious freedom was implicit in many of the Court's earliest First Amendment cases. 128 Recently, the doctrine reemerged in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 129 with the Court observing that "courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on non-beneficiaries." 130 In all these cases, the doctrine of third-party harm is used, whether implicitly or explicitly, as a balancing test: a judicial exemption or statutory accommodation is appropriate if and only if the religious interests at stake outweigh the magnitude of the burden and the likelihood of harm occurring. While in one line of cases, the Court has expressed profound suspicion of balancing tests when it comes to religious freedom, 131 in another equally prominent line of cases, the Court has employed a balancing test wherein harms to third parties are weighed against the benefit to the religious group. 132 As the third-party-harm test becomes more prominent, scholars have grappled with the proper structure and function of the test. Analyzing the third-party-harm test as a balancing test, this Part examines how the third 128 
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[Vol. 86 party ought to be identified and how the scales in the balancing test ought to be calibrated, before finally turning to the invocation of the third-party-harm doctrine in Hobby Lobby.
Third-Party Harms as a Balancing Test
To assess whether a given action imposes impermissible harms on a third party, the Court in Texas Monthly laid out a three-factor balancing test: first, the magnitude of the burden; second, the likelihood of the feared harm occurring; and third, the magnitude of the religious interest at stake. 133 First, as the Court stated in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 134 the burden in question must be substantial.
In Thornton, Connecticut's Sabbath observance statute granted a benefit exclusively to religious persons, namely, the right not to work on whatever day of the week that person observed the Sabbath. 135 This religion-only benefit imposed a significant burden on employers and non-Sabbatarian employees by requiring them to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee. 136 The significance of the burden on third parties was central to the Court's rejection of the statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Determining when a burden is substantial is often challenging, however, and does not admit of a bright line analysis. 137 While there will be difficult cases at the margin, there will also be cases in which the substantiality of the harm, such as death or serious injury, is unquestionable.
Second, scholars argue that courts ought to carefully scrutinize the likelihood of the harm occurring. 138 Where the risk of that harm is vanishingly small, an exemption should not be denied simply because it might impose harm on a third party. For example, in Holt v. Hobbs, 139 the state cited security concerns related to hiding contraband in denying a Muslim inmate's request to grow a half-inch beard as part of his religious observance. 140 The Court rejected this argument. The likelihood that the inmate would conceal a dangerous weapon in his half-inch beard was so vanishingly small that the burden on third parties was not only not substantial, it was nearly nonexistent. 141 Courts have extended this analysis to situations in which the likelihood of occurrence is less remote and the potential harm is very severe. For example, in custody disputes in which one 133 . For an excellent discussion of the three-factor test, see Christopher C. Lund parent is a Jehovah's Witness (and thus opposed to blood transfusions for religious reasons), where the child is healthy and the likelihood that he or she would require a transfusion is low, courts have refused to award custody to the non-Witness parent solely because of the threat of harm. 142 The likelihood of a healthy child falling so ill as to require a blood transfusion is, courts have concluded, too remote to be relevant. 143 Finally, scholars argue that courts ought to consider the magnitude of the religious interests at stake. Measuring the magnitude of a religious interest is, however, quite difficult. The ministerial exception is the paradigmatic instance of courts considering the magnitude of the religious interest at stake. 144 The ability of religious bodies to choose their leaders free from state interference is so central to the full and free functioning of these bodies that judicial exemptions or statutory accommodations to allow this functioning are appropriate. 145 Even where this causes real and significant harm to third parties (such as the loss of employment in both Hosanna-Tabor and Amos), the significant religious interests at stake in the appointment of ministers outweigh the harm to the fired employees. The extension of the ministerial exception in Amos to employees engaged in nonreligious work in secular affiliates of a religious organization, however, raises concerns that the oncenarrow exception is now much more capacious. Beyond the ministerial exception, courts have struggled to arrive at a method for assessing the magnitude of the religious belief, proffering various criteria, such as the centrality of the belief and the sincerity of the belief.
Courts have long resisted evaluating the truth of a religious claim, 146 and at times this resistance has been extended to evaluations of the sincerity of a religious claim. 147 By and large, however, courts have distinguished between assessing the truth of a religious claim on the one hand and its centrality or sincerity on the other, and they have been willing and able to evaluate the latter fairly and effectively. 148 Of the three factors for evaluating whether an accommodation impermissibly imposes harm on a third party, then, the 142 
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Identifying the Third Party
Identifying who, precisely, counts as a third party for purposes of the thirdparty-harm test has significant implications for how such claims can be litigated. Determining who, if anyone, has standing to challenge a judicial exemption or statutory accommodation can be difficult. 149 When identifying the harmed third party, two overarching questions emerge. First, how identifiable must the third party be? Second, ought the harm to "internal" third parties be treated differently from the harm to "external" third parties?
First, here is significant disagreement as to the degree of specificity with which courts ought to identify the harmed third party. There is a line of cases, exemplified by Reynolds and Smith, in which the identity of the third party is defined quite capaciously, seeming to encompass the entire body politic. 150 That the Court implicitly identified the state as the harmed third party rather than, for example, wives or children living in polygamous households, is perhaps surprising. 151 Likewise, in Yoder, the harms that the Court weighed were the harm to the state of having an uneducated citizen and the harm to the parents' free exercise of religion. 152 As Justice Douglas notes in his dissent in Yoder, however, the Court arguably did not correctly identify the third party most directly harmed by the exemption: the Amish children. 153 Further, Jonathan Lipson has argued that where the harmed party is the state as an abstraction, the ability to interfere with the internal affairs of a religious organization ought to be strictly curtailed. 154 Second, where the harmed third parties are individuals, rather than the state, should it matter whether the harmed party is a member of the same religious community? One might argue that harms imposed on third-party insiders, such as members of the religion, ought to be given less weight, provided that the insiders have a real ability to exit the offending organization, than harms imposed on third parties who are removed from the religious organization. 155 Even were one to accept the insider versus outsider 149 . For example, secular daycares that have challenged statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares have had great difficulty establishing standing. See infra Part III.B.
150. In both cases, the key concern was the damage an exemption would do to the cohesion of the body politic were individuals allowed to become laws unto themselves. See Emp't Div. 151. By contrast, the invocation of a depersonalized body politic in Smith is perhaps more understandable, as it is difficult to imagine who would suffer individualized harm were Native Americans granted an accommodation to use peyote in ritual settings. dichotomy, determining who qualifies as an insider can be challenging. For example, are children "insiders" for the purposes of analysis if they lack a meaningful ability to exit the community? 156 How to identify the relevant party for the purposes of the third-party-harm test remains unsettled, and the ultimate resolution of this question will have a significant effect on how questions of standing in cases invoking the test are resolved.
Calibrating the Scales for the Balancing Test
Even where scholars agree that harm to third parties ought to be the test for determining whether a statutory accommodation or judicial exemption for religious practice is legitimate, how to calibrate the test poses additional challenges. Opinions run the gamut from setting the scales evenly to allowing religious communities a "thumb on the scale." Proponents of setting the scales evenly offer both practical and principled reasons for so doing. In his analysis of Yoder, Ira Lupu argues that, despite the language of substantial burden and compelling interest, the Court was actually engaged in an even-handed balancing of the interests of both parties, factoring in the harms for each side at the margin. 157 This fact-intensive analysis, where there was no presumption either in favor of or opposing an exemption and where the benefits and harms of an exemption were carefully weighed, best serves the interests of both parties. Indeed, as Lupu notes, the ability to balance benefits and harms accurately is so important that it should be solely the province of the legislature, such that judicial exemptions should be abandoned in favor of statutory accommodations. 158 Adopting a slightly different approach, Jonathan Lipson advocates for the scales to be evenly set when the religious exercise harms third parties but for a thumb to be on the scale for religious persons or organizations when it does not. 159 As such, "[t]he thumb should rest on the scales in favor of religious actors in inverse proportion to the presence of third parties." 160 By contrast, Michael McConnell would grant religion a thumb on the scale even where the practice in question imposes harm on third parties. 161 For McConnell, religion has a special constitutional status, and as such, while legislatures may consider economic and other harms to third parties when considering accommodations, they are not required to do so. 162 Though there is of exit, particularly where exemptions may impair a person's ability to function outside of the religious community).
156. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. The same logic also applies to the children of Jehovah's Witnesses who may be too young to effectively exit the church in order to receive a life-saving blood transfusion. Though the idea that harm to third parties ought to limit judicial exemptions and statutory accommodations has run throughout Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence, in recent years the third-party harms test has enjoyed a new prominence. The Court's discussion of harm to third parties as a limiting factor on religious accommodations in Hobby Lobby points to a new strategy for the parents of children who died or were injured in religiously affiliated daycares excepted from state regulations to challenge these accommodations. 165 In Hobby Lobby, a for-profit, closely held corporation sought an exemption from the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) mandated contraceptive coverage for drugs or devices that operate after the moment of conception because contraception contravenes the owners' sincere religious belief that life begins at conception. 166 Under RFRA, a government action that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise must (1) serve a compelling government interest and (2) be the least restrictive means of serving that interest. 167 In a five-to-four decision, the Court assumed arguendo that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that people have access to contraceptive coverage as part of their health insurance but found that the mandate failed the second prong, as there are less restrictive ways to achieve the same goal. 168 Indeed, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations already excepted nonprofit organizations with religious objections from the contraceptive mandate. 169 The group-health-insurance issuer for such organizations must exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer's plan and issue separate contraceptive payments for plan participants without imposing the costs on the organization. 170 The decision had significant implications for religious liberty jurisprudence, chief among them weakening the "substantial" in "substantial burden." 171 Though the 163 doctrine of third-party harm does not figure prominently in the majority's decision, it appears in a modified form in the Court's discussion of the government's argument that the plaintiff is seeking an exemption from a legal obligation to confer a benefit on a third party. 172 Indeed, the assumption that the government would provide an alternative mechanism for female employees to obtain free contraception and thus to suffer no harm is key to the holding. Though the Court (rightly) rejected HHS's argument that RFRA does not permit the state to burden one party's free exercise so long as the burden confers a benefit on another party, 173 it noted that impeding women's receipt of healthcare benefits harms women and is not what Congress contemplated. 174 Though the question of harm to third parties was dismissed rather cavalierly in the majority decision, Justice Ginsburg raised it forcefully in her dissent: "No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religionbased exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to othershere, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect." 175 The harms imposed on third parties-here, female employees of corporations exempted from the ACA mandate-are significant, from increased contraceptive costs, to the risk of unplanned pregnancies, to the denial of contraceptives used to treat other diseases such as menstrual disorders. 176 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito acknowledged that the denial of contraceptive coverage burdened third parties but concluded that HHS, by creating an accommodation for certain nonprofit religious organizations whereby the costs for contraceptive coverage would be borne not by the organization but by the plan issuer, had already developed a workaround to alleviate this burden. 177 Indeed, had the Court applied the three-factor third-party-harm test, the outcome would likely have been different. First, the magnitude of the harm to third parties is high: the inability to control one's reproductive life imposes significant burdens on women. Second, the likelihood of harm is high: excluding contraceptive coverage from the employer health plan would have an immediate and noticeable effect on women. 178 Though the fact of a worksimply deferred to Hobby Lobby's assertion that the mandate imposed a substantial burden); see also REV. 1453 REV. , 1492 REV. -95 (2015 . 178 . The harm to third parties cannot be effectively alleviated by requiring women to obtain contraceptive-only coverage, as the attendant statutory, regulatory, and practical barriers this entails create significant hurdles for women seeking contraception. Contraception-only 1420
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
[ Vol. 86 around to accommodate religious nonprofits may diminish the likelihood of harm somewhat, these work-arounds have been challenged repeatedly and their continued existence is somewhat precarious. 179 Finally, the magnitude of the affected belief is also high. Courts, in recognition of the importance of these beliefs to many different religious communities, are particularly sensitive to religious views about when life begins. Thus, though the Hobby Lobby majority did not address the question of third party harms in any depth, the issue was raised, and with especial force in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.
Had the third-party-harm balancing test been applied, it is likely that the harm imposed on the female employees would outweigh the burden imposed on the employer's religious beliefs. With this account of the third-party-harm doctrine as it intersects with the religion clauses in place, this Note brings the doctrine to bear on the difficult question of legislative accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares.
III. STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS FOR RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED DAYCARES: ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CONCERNS
As the preceding Parts demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is complex and contradictory. Some states, 180 perhaps noting the Court's shifting interpretation of these Clauses and seeking to protect religious institutions from state interference, enacted statutes excusing religiously affiliated daycares from complying with certain state regulations. 181 Even after Smith, when the Court adopted a deep suspicion of judicial exemptions, the statutes remained in force. 182 Indeed, where these statutes were challenged, the challenges were wholly unsuccessful. 183 Part III.A considers several such statutes, while Part III.B examines various (failed) efforts to challenge these statutes.
A. Statutory Accommodations for Religiously Affiliated Daycares
All states regulate daycare facilities. Though the precise scope of the regulations, the mechanisms for ensuring compliance, and the penalties for failure to comply vary from state to state, there are significant similarities. Broadly speaking, states prescribe a rigorous set of regulations for daycare facilities that cover a wide range of topics including character and qualifications of the caregivers, minimum child-to-caregiver ratios, acceptable disciplinary practices, health and safety standards, and recordkeeping requirements. 184 The definition of "daycare facility" is quite capacious in many states, such that the regulations cover a broad range of childcare arrangements, from formal preschools to in-home care. 185 A number of states have enacted statutes exempting religiously affiliated daycares from many of the regulations that govern secular facilities. The scope of these accommodations ranges widely, from near-total exemption from state regulation in Alabama 186 to more limited exemptions in North Carolina, with other states, including Florida and Virginia falling somewhere in between. The accommodations address issues of health and safety, staff qualifications and training, and reporting requirements. Considering the scope of the statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares provides valuable insight into the internal logic of the accommodations.
Before turning to a close examination of the statutes regulating daycares and the accommodations extended to religiously affiliated daycares, a brief note on the complicated history of establishment clauses in state constitutions underscores the complex place of religiously affiliated educational institutions in state legislative schema. In response to the influx of Roman Catholics to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century-and their attendant efforts to establish Roman Catholic schools-a significant number of states adopted so-called Blaine amendments into their state constitutions. 187 Blaine amendments prohibit all financial support of religious institutions by the state. 188 Though the Blaine amendments are 185. See ALA. CODE § 38-7-8. The Alabama Administrative Code defines childcare facility capaciously, requiring any facility that provides care for one or more children unrelated to the provider for more than four hours a day to be licensed whether or not the provider is compensated. Id. 186. Alabama's sweeping accommodations have received some scrutiny recently, and there is currently a bill before the Alabama House of Representatives that would rescind nearly all of the current accommodations and require religiously affiliated daycares to submit to the same licensing requirements as secular daycares. or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution."); MO. CONST. art I, § 7 ("[N]o money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in statewide health and safety regulations that govern secular daycares, it requires excepted facilities to meet the minimum standards set by the relevant local agency. 197 Second, while even those states with the most far-reaching exceptions require compliance with basic health and fire regulations, many states grant broad exceptions from standards regulating teacher qualifications and staff ratios. For example, in Florida, personnel working in nonexempt facilities must meet a host of requirements, from screening for "good moral character" to training in child development. 198 Personnel in religiously affiliated facilities, however, are exempted from all training requirements and must merely demonstrate that they meet screening requirements related to past criminal activity. 199 Similarly, in Virginia, personnel in religiously affiliated daycares that choose to be exempt from licensure need not meet any training requirements. They are required only to obtain "a search of the central registry . . . on any founded complaint of child abuse or neglect and a criminal records check" and to provide a sworn statement disclosing whether the applicant has ever been "the subject of a founded complaint of child abuse or neglect," convicted of a crime, or the subject of pending criminal charges. 200 Not only is the staff of exempted facilities not held to the same standards with regards to training and background, but some states also exempt religiously affiliated daycares from minimum staff-to-student ratios. Of all the statutory accommodations, exemption from minimum ratios is perhaps the most significant in terms of both differential costs imposed on secular and religious facilities and a facility's ability to adequately supervise and protect the children in its care. In Alabama, exempted facilities are not required to meet any minimum staffing requirements, with the caveat that they "make available" to parents the adult-to-child ratio. 201 201 . ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (2017) ("The following information shall be available to parents or guardian prior to enrolling their children in said church ministry; staff qualifications; pupilstaff ratio; discipline policies; type of curriculum used in the learning program; the religious teachings to be given each child; and the type of lunch program available."). Having done this, exempt programs are almost wholly relieved of any state oversight. They are required only to inform the department that they are providing this information to the parents and that affiliated daycares. 210 In Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 211 the Court applied the Lemon test as interpreted by Amos, which had been decided while the case was on remand to the district court. 212 Moving quickly over the first, or purpose, prong of the Lemon test to the second prong, the Court found that the accommodation not only does not promote religion but also that denying the accommodation would effectively inhibit religion. 213 In its discussion of excessive entanglement, the Court relied on the Amos Court's finding that requiring a religious group to defend its beliefs in free exercise litigation before a judge who may be ignorant of the group's religious mission and purpose implicates establishment concerns. 214 To deny religiously affiliated daycares exemptions from certain state regulations would be to require the kind of issue-by-issue free exercise litigation that Amos eschews. 215 This would both "chill and interfere with religious groups, enmeshing judges in intrusive and sometimes futile attempts to understand the contours, sincerity and centrality of the religious beliefs of others." 216 In Forte v. Coler, 217 in which a secular daycare likewise challenged the constitutionality of statutory exemptions for religiously affiliated daycares, the court drew directly on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Forest Hills, characterizing it as "highly persuasive." 218 Noting that the accommodation satisfies the first and second prongs of the Lemon test, the court then noted that not only does the statute not promote the entanglement of church and state, it also effects more complete separation of the two than would obtain in the absence of the accommodation. 219 Further, as in Forest Hills, the accommodation eases the burden on the court system by obviating the need to litigate each and every free exercise claim that would be brought under the state RFRA by a religiously affiliated daycare, thereby avoiding entanglement concerns. 220 In addition to challenging the statutory accommodations for entanglement concerns, many secular daycares have asserted equal protection claims. In such cases, secular providers' claims that the accommodation improperly discriminates between religious and secular facilities have not been successful. Courts have routinely rejected these equal protection claims, 210 . See id. at *4. The Court also considered entanglement under the aegis of substantive due process, finding that the state's interest in limiting church-state entanglement and respecting free exercise could provide a rational basis for the accommodations, resulting in the dismissal of the due process claim. Id 221 for instance, the court rejected the secular providers' argument that the accommodations violated the Equal Protection Clause because they were "a form of 'arbitrary and capricious' discrimination among similarly situated daycare providers that lacks any rational basis in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 222 Rather, the court observed that not only were secular and religious daycares not similarly situated as a matter of constitutional law but also that, in passing the statutory accommodation, the state acted with a "rational and permissible purpose." 223 The court then offered several rationales as to why the state would structure the accommodation as it does. 224 Likewise, in Forte, the court noted that the statute was motivated by the permissible purpose of limiting interference with free exercise and that the accommodations were rationally related to this permissible end. 225 Finally, courts have been unsympathetic to the secular providers' ability even to challenge the accommodation, with many courts finding that the secular daycares lack standing to bring their claims. In Kid's Care, a group of secular daycares asserted that the freedom from onerous regulations gave religiously affiliated daycares a competitive advantage and inflicted economic harm on secular facilities. 226 Specifically, the secular facilities contended that, were the accommodations removed, more state subsidies for childcare would flow to the secular daycares. 227 The court rejected this argument, however, concluding that the plaintiffs had offered only highly general allegations of harm and that a facial attack on the law fails because "it is apparent that the statute is not 'unconstitutional in all its applications. ' Id. 224. Id. at *5 ("For example, the State might want to avoid the higher financial expense that would result if it conducted independent evaluations of providers, or, it might find it more efficient to monitor the bad-faith conduct of exempted day-care providers through means other than its licensing decisions. Or, the State might have fashioned its certification process so as to keep the State out of the business of defining what counts as religion and to limit the possible intrusions on the free exercise of religion that could result if religious certification depended upon bureaucratic discretion."). 225 . 2001) ). Further, the Court rejected the Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, finding that not only did the plaintiffs have no colorable allegation of a property interest at issue, but, even were it true that more money would flow to secular daycares, this would still not rise to the level of a legitimate entitlement. See id. at *4 ("Even if, for the sake of argument, the plaintiffs were entitled to operate in a regulatory world without religious exemptions, their hope and expectancy in the extra funds that might later be determined to be due them in a post-exemption world still would not amount to a present constitutionally cognizable property interest.").
The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, found that secular daycares did have standing to challenge the accommodations. 229 Whereas the Alabama court found that religiously affiliated and secular daycares were not similarly situated, the Fourth Circuit found that they were. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 230 the Fourth Circuit thus found that the secular daycares had standing to bring the challenge. 231 The challenges secular daycares have faced with regard to standing are instructive and counsel in favor of identifying a litigation strategy in which the plaintiffs are not secular daycares. If the harm-to-third-party doctrine is used to challenge these accommodations, the parties who would bring the cases would be the parents of the children who were injured or died while in the care of understaffed and underregulated religiously affiliated facilities.
IV. USING THE DOCTRINE OF THIRD-PARTY HARM TO CHALLENGE STATUTORY ACCOMMODATIONS FOR RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED DAYCARES
Given recent developments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly the renewed attention paid to the doctrine of harm to third parties, the time is ripe to revisit statutory accommodations granted to religiously affiliated daycares. Where statutory accommodations for religiously affiliated daycares have been challenged, the daycares have asserted that regulations create excessive entanglement, invoking both free exercise and establishment arguments. 232 Supporters of accommodations assert that free exercise would be limited were religiously affiliated daycares forced to comply with, for example, regulatory oversight of disciplinary methods, such as corporal punishment. 233 Likewise, regulations that dictate staff qualifications raise both free exercise and establishment concerns under the ministerial exception. 234 Underlying both arguments is the question of who has standing to challenge these accommodations. Even were plaintiffs to demonstrate standing, they would then need to demonstrate that their interests outweigh the burdens on free exercise. The Texas Monthly test,
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 86
incorporating a sensitivity to both free exercise concerns in the first prong of its second step and establishment concerns in the second prong of its second step, may fruitfully be applied. Taking up first the question of standing and then the two steps of the Texas Monthly test, this Note argues that, by using the third-party-harm test, the parent of a child injured in a religiously affiliated daycare that is exempted from complying with state regulations may successfully challenge these statutory accommodations. First, where statutory exemptions for religiously affiliated daycares have been challenged, the plaintiffs have been owners of secular daycares. 235 Courts have found, across the board, that these plaintiffs failed to show that the exemptions resulted in actual economic harm and so lacked standing to bring the challenges. 236 With courts finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, many of these cases have been dismissed early in the litigation process. Were the parents or guardians of children who suffered injury or death in facilities exempt from some or most state regulations to bring a case, however, clearing the initial hurdle of standing-demonstrating that they suffered a direct, cognizable injury-should be easier. 237 Though the parents may face difficulty proving causation between the lack of state oversight and the child's injury, were they able to demonstrate standing, they would at least advance further in the litigation process.
Second, the first prong of the Texas Monthly test's second step asks whether exemption from state regulations lifts a free exercise burden that would otherwise be imposed by the government. 238 Here, most regulations, including fire and safety inspections, food preparation, and record keeping, do not appear to implicate free exercise concerns. The concerns raised in Forte and Forest Hills thus seem overinclusive. 239 Excusing religiously affiliated daycares from basic health and safety regulations risks sacrificing state interests in the protection of its most vulnerable members on the altar of religion.
Some regulations, however, including those touching on discipline and corporal punishment, may implicate free exercise concerns under the Texas Monthly test. Of the states that offer statutory accommodations, many explicitly extend the exception to disciplinary procedures. 240 Corporal punishment of children has deep roots in several religious traditions, 241 and exempting religiously affiliated facilities from regulations concerning discipline lifts a free exercise burden that would otherwise be imposed. 242 Regulations governing the qualifications of daycare staff raise separate concerns about excessive entanglement. 243 If a religiously affiliated daycare considers itself an extension of the group's ministry, then the staff would be engaged in ministerial work. 244 Though the ministerial exception is typically invoked by religious organizations as a defense against a Title VII violation, 245 it is conceivable that a religiously affiliated daycare may invoke the ministerial exception were it forced to comply with state regulations concerning staff qualifications. Indeed, here the ministerial exception is, in effect, sanctioned by the state through the statutory accommodation freeing the facilities from regulation. 246 The likelihood that an Amos-like ministerial exception would extend to staff at religiously affiliated daycares is, however, unclear post-HosannaTabor. Deploying the familiar three-step analysis, the magnitude of the harm imposed on the third party-job loss-is high; the likelihood of the harm occurring is high; and the magnitude of the belief affected is minimal. Critics of Amos might go further, arguing that Amos marked a significant-and inappropriate-extension of the ministerial exception from persons engaged in preaching and teaching to employees whose jobs have no confessional dimension and thus ought not be extended to daycare workers. 247 The extent to which exceptions from training requirements for staff in religiously affiliated daycares is required or desirable is, then, difficult to resolve, with
